Against these the advocates of oligarchy contend that superiority in wealth, or intelligence, or birth, should carry superiority in power and that the supreme authority should therefore rest in the few.
Both these arguments, Aristotle declares, miss the precise criterion, which is to be found only after reaching a correct conception of the nature and end of the state. The state is not an association for the acquisition of wealth, or for the mere maintenance of life, or, like an international alliance, for the promotion of definite political and commercial interests of the contracting parties. The end of the state is not that certain persons shall have a common dwelling-place, and shall refrain from mutual injury and shall be in habitual intercourse with one another.
The state embraces within itself associa- tions for all these and other purposes, but such associations are based on friendship 4t'Xa and look merely to living together. On the other hand, the state has for its end liv- ing well - living happily and nobly: it is an association not for mere life, but for noble actions.
Virtue, especially that species called justice, is to be the crite- rion, rather than freedom or birth or wealth. Must sovereign power, then, be ascribed to the mass of the people, or to some limited class, or to some individual? Primarily, Aristotle an- swers, to the mass of the people. For the aggregate virtue 2 1 III, ix. It connotes much more than strict moral excellence.
Custom has confirmed the translation of dper4 by virtue, and I shall adhere to this, subject to the caution here noted. The same answer, indeed, would follow from a rigid application of the principle of wealth; for the whole is wealthier than any of its parts. But popular sovereignty, as thus conceived, is sub- ject to an important qualification.
In the controversies of Hellenic politics over oligarchy and democracy the underlying thought was that the people o 8,qios and the few oi oWXyoL in any given community constituted in fact two states, each existing or ceasing to exist, as the one or the other faction gained control.
This idea had much justi- fication in the facts of the conflict. Democratic triumph in most cases meant the actual physical expulsion of the oligarchs from the community; while oligarchic triumph meant the exclusion of the mass of the people from all political rights, and hence from the state, in the sense in which Aristotle defined it. But more commonly he conceives the sovereign power rather as the highest authority in the administrative hierarchy, or as that part of the administrative organization which deals with the most important questions of policy.
In other words, he thinks of the sovereign as subordinate to the state, and of the state as existing apart from any particular possessor of the chief governmental power. The latter conception of sovereignty is that which the philos- opher employs in deciding that the mass of the people must be sovereign.
This does not imply that either the people as a whole or every individual alike is best adapted to administer all the offices of the state; but that the greatest and most ulti- mate questions must be finally passed upon by the whole people. In practice this would mean, he explains, that the function of the popular body should be chiefly the election and censure of the officers of administration.
For such functions the people as a whole is eminently fitted. It may, indeed, be 1 SUpra, p. But Aristotle rejects this contention. The verdict of the general public is valid in politics, just as it is in musical con- tests and in banquets; not the musician and the cook, but they who hear the music and eat the dinner are best qualified to render judgment.
The sovereignty of the whole people, therefore, subject to the qualification that it be manifested in the election of magis- trates and in holding them to account for their conduct in office, is the primary solution of the problem as to the location of ultimate power in the state. This solution presumes, how- ever, that the citizens are on the whole not far from the same general level of virtue.
Suppose, on the contrary, that among them is a small number, or even a single individual, whose virtue overwhelmingly exceeds that of all the rest, whether taken individually or collectively.
In such a case, there can be, Aristotle holds, but one answer: the preeminently virtuous few or one is the logical sovereign. It is a consciousness of this fact, he explains, that has led democracies to devise the institution of ostracism.
An actual popular sovereign cannot tolerate in the body politic an individual who in any way em- bodies the possibility of becoming the ideal sovereign. Finally, above every form of personal sovereignty, whether of the one, the few or the whole people, must be placed, according to Aristotle, the sovereignty of the law vo',ot. Only where the law is uncertain or incomplete may the authority of man be conclusive.
Granting that, as some con- tend, the rigidity of law works frequent injustice; yet less injustice will spring from the prescriptions of customary law ol VIAOt ot ia'rl T'o Mos; than from the unchecked WILI of any man. For such law is free from the influence of human passions. The rule of law, Aristotle finely says, is the rule of god and reason only; in the rule of man there appears in addition something of the brute.
The Forms of Constitution. Aristotle primarily classifies constitutions, first, according to the mere number of those in whom sovereign power is vested and, second, according to the end to which the conduct of government is directed. The latter principle distinguishes pure from corrupt forms, for the end of the state is the perfection of all its members. When the government is ad- ministered with this end in view, the state is pure; when the administration aims at the interest, not of all the citizens, but of the governing body alone, the state is corrupt.
The few. The whole people. In respect to this classification it is to be observed that the pure forms are based on an ideal which belongs to political science in its broadest and most abstract sense; 2 while the corruptions 7rapEKcI3does9 , so called because they deviate from the ideal, are what fall strictly within the field of politics in its practical and independent character. Aristotle's conceptions of royalty and aristocracy are hardly less idealistic and fanciful than Plato's.
Royalty is substantially the rule of the one per- fect man; aristocracy is the rule of the few perfect men, not easily to be distinguished in their attributes from Plato's "' guard- ians. By transposition of the order of the books and by high-handed rearrangement of paragraphs, various plausible schemes have been devised in which coherency of development is pre- This content downloaded from Only in the case of the polity is an ideal brought into close relation with a pos- sible constitution.
The term woXmte a, which means constitu- tion in general, is applied by Aristotle also to the special form of democratic constitution. And polity, in this narrow sense, he views in some places as an abstract ideal, but in others as a system quite susceptible of realization through a proper tempering of actual democracy. For monarchy the philosopher can find a rational justifica- tion only in the purely ideal case of an individual absolutely preeminent in virtue.
To such an ideally perfect man may be ascribed the right to rule,' unrestrained by law. But for actual states the best possible law has a better ground for supremacy than the best possible man.
And for the work of government subject to law, the capacity of an individual can never equal that of an aggregation of individuals. The many is less easily corrupted than the one; and even though the one may have nominal supremacy, the physical impossibility of conducting the administration single-handed renders necessary a plurality in government which is not different in kind from a plurality immediately under the constitution.
Aristotle's conclusion is, in fact, that monarchy not only is illogical, but also is practi- cally impossible. For his detailed examination of the non-monarchic constitu- tions, Aristotle points out that the different forms rest upon a deeper foundation than that of mere number in the sovereign body.
Oligarchy and democracy signify, respectively, the dom- served. These are all ingenious, and most of them are scientific. Whether any of them is Aristotelian, no one can say. The great barbarian monarchies do not lie within his category of state 7roXtreta. But these two forms again require, according to Aristotle, further subdivision.
Democracies differ from one another, and the same is true of oligarchies; here again the various shades,' of which he enu- merates four under each form, have a close relation to social and economic facts. In the detailed treatment of aristocracy and polity, the origi- nal character of the two is almost entirely lost sight of by Aristotle. Their relation to oligarchy and democracy appears no longer as that of the pure to the corrupt, dependent upon the end to which government is directed.
On the contrary, the distinctions are made to turn upon the characteristic prin- ciple that determines participation in political functions. The principles that are in conflict for supremacy in every com- munity, Aristotle says, are liberty, wealth, virtue and goo d birth evye'veta. Where the conduct of the government is assigned on the basis of liberty and equality, which is an essential element in liberty , the constitution is democratic; where on the basis of wealth, it is oligarchic; where on the basis of virtue, in the strictly ideal sense, it is aristocratic.
When with these two virtue also is combined, the resulting form is entitled to, and generally receives, the name of aristocracy. But this mixed aristocracy he carefully distinguishes from the pure and ideal aristocracy of which the principle is virtue alone. This criterion had been used by Plato. The full application of Aristotelian analysis thus gives a rather formidable aggregate of forms of constitution; and it is doubtful if the philosopher in his best estate could have assigned an actual government clearly and categorically to any one particular class.
Certainly The Politics, as we have it, is very far from clear in distinguishing each from all the rest. Polity and the mixed aristocracy are especially difficult to dis- entangle,' and various shades of democracy and oligarchy approach perplexingly near to both. But there can be no doubt as to the success of the philosopher in detecting the broad underlying influences, historical, social and economic, through which the manifold variety in political organization is determined.
It is his realization of the diversity in these influences that leads him more or less unconsciously to shift from time to time the basis of his classification. The practical significance of the distinction between consti- tutions on the basis of principle is best revealed in his refined analysis of the three elements essential to every government. On the divergencies of form and function in these three elements depends the character of the various constitutions.
It is because these divergencies are practically infinite in number that the forms of constitution shade imperceptibly from one to another of the prominent types. In extreme and unques- tionable democracy the deliberative organ would be an as- sembly of all the people, determining directly all questions pertaining to this organ; 3 the magistracies would be filled by lot, and all citizens would be eligible for all offices; the ad- ministration of justice would be in the hands of a jury court, chosen by lot from the general body of citizens and exercis- 1 Sparta is given in different places as an example of each of these forms.
IV, vii, 4 and ix, 6-io. In extreme oligarchy, the deliberative organ would be a close corporation of very wealthy citizens, with unlimited powers ; the magistracies would be based on a high property qualification for eligibility; and the jury court, with general jurisdiction, would consist of a small body, elected on a high property qualification.
Polity would exhibit some such combination as this: for the delibera- tive organ, a body of citizens, with at most a moderate prop- erty qualification, exercising jurisdiction over only a part of the subjects normal to this organ ;I the magistracies filled through election, either alone or in combination with the lot, but with a property qualification for eligibility; the administration of justice divided among a number of courts and magistrates, the jurors, like the magistrates, being chosen by a combina- tion of lot and election, and with a moderate property quali- fication.
Practically, the most conspicuous characteristics of the various forms are conceived to be: in democracy, con- centration of important functions in the general body of citi- zens, assignment of offices by lot, as the guaranty of perfect equality, and compensation for public services; in oligarchy, concentration of functions in a narrow body of the wealthy, assignment of offices on a property qualification and unpaid public services; in polity, diffusion of functions among various organs, assignment of offices by a combination of lot and elec- tion.
Practical or mixed aristocracy would be determined by the employment of olig-archic forms, subject to a primary regard for fitness, rather than for wealth, in the ruling body. The Best State. In approaching the question as to which form of constitution is the best, the same analytical method which so minutely dis- tinguished the different varieties is applied, with the result that no categorical answer is recogrnized.
That is, the best must rule; if one man is pre- eminent in excellence Aperi , the form will be royalty; other- wise, pure aristocracy. In human society extremes of wealth and poverty are the main sources of evil. The one brings arrogance and a lack of capacity to obey; the other brings slavishness and a lack of capacity to command.
Where a population is divided into the two classes of very rich and very poor, there can be no real state; for there can be no real friendship between the classes, and friendship is the essen- tial principle of all association.
In such a state the influences which make for peace and order will wholly prevail and stability will be insured. The constitution which in all respects embodies the principle of the mean is polity. This constitution, there- fore, must be on the average the best. Circumstances, Aristotle holds, may make any form the best. The general principle here is that the element which desires the existing constitu- tion to stand shall be stronger than those which desire change. In other words, stability is the criterion; and that constitution is best which under the circumstances will last the longest.
Theoretically, it would apparently stand first of the two. So far as it is possible to arrange an order of excellence with reference to all the various points of view from which Aristotle considers the different forms of constitution, the following' would convey his ideas: i, ideal royalty; 2, pure aristocracy; 3, mixed aristocracy; 4, polity; 5, most moderate democ- racy; 6, most moderate oligarchy; 7, the two intermediate varieties of democracy and oligarchy, the former having pref- erence over the corresponding grades of the latter; 8, extreme democracy; 9, extreme oligarchy; IO, tyranny.
The plan of The Politics includes a comprehensive discus- sion of the conditions essential to the best constitution. It is not clear whether this feature of the work was intended by Aristotle to deal primarily with the best absolutely or with the best on the average.
But in the text of The Politics, as it has come down to us, the details of constitutional organization are wholly lacking; and attention is confined to the determi- nation of the most favorable external conditions for the state and the most effective methods of character-building for the people.
As there is nothing noble or exalted in the ruling of slaves by an indi- vidual, so there is nothing noble or exalted in the exercise of 1 Cf. Here the discussion is announced in general terms.
The specific purpose is a moot question in the controversies of the commentators as to the order of the books. The realization of this ideal depends partly upon external conditions, which must be more or less determined by chance, but to a far greater extent upon the character and culture of the people, which may be fixed through scientific legis- lation.
Aristotle's treatment of both branches of the subject strongly suggests that of Plato in The Laws. He aims to pre- sent the desirable features of a city state, without exceeding the limits of the possible, and he employs constantly the doc- trine of the mean. The size of the population and the extent of territory must be sufficiently great to make the state self- sufficing.
But the number of people must not exceed what can be well supervised Evovvow7rrso ; the community must be a -city 7ro'Xt and not a people govo9. In natural endowments the popula- tion should resemble the Greeks, who combine the spirit and courage of the northern races with the intellectual keenness of the Asiatics.
VII, vii, 2, 3. Sev- eral philosophers since Aristotle have adopted his principle, and have applied it so as to show that their own particular people, because lying south of some nations and north of others, are especially qualified for dominion. So Bodin. Of these the first two, on principles already mentioned, while in the state cannot be of it.
The other classes are as to personnel one. They must constitute the citizens proper, must owIn the land in severalty, save a part owned by the state and must perform at successive periods of life the func- tions of warriors, administrators participants in all forms of purely political life and priests.
Performing thus in succes- sion the various duties of citizenship, they will maintain that equality which is distinctive of the free citizen and will round out the civic character by experience in both ruling and being ruled. Supported by the produce of their land, they will enjoy that leisure without which true virtue is impossible. In addition to these important considerations Aristotle dis- cusses many minor features of the internal ordering of the city, and devotes particular attention to the arrangements for de- fense against attack.
His ideal city is not contemplated as remote from the contingencies of foreign war. The topogra- phy of the site, the water supply, the arrangement of the streets - all must have reference to a possible siege; and forti- fications, both walls and citadel, he regards as indispensable.
Clinging firmly to his principle that aggressive war is excluded from the purposes of the ideal state, he maintains that a full provision of all the latest improvements in warlike equipment must be made as the surest guaranty against attack. The ultimate function of the state is pedagogic. For the perfection of the commu- nity depends upon the perfection of its constituent members, and the perfection of the latter can be achieved only through the cultivation of moral and intellectual excellence.
Hence a system of uniform, compulsory, public education is the first essential of the best state, and the administration of such a system is the most important function of government. Aris- totle's project of educational legislation is of the same general This content downloaded from It aims at mental culture rather than practical utility, lays due stress upon the physical side of the training,' and attaches to music a moral significance and a character-making influence that are quite incomprehensible to the modern mind.
The full application of this system is to begin in the case of each citizen at the age of seven. But no less important to Aristotle than to Plato seems governmental supervision of life from its very inception.
We find in The Politics provision for a rigid regulation of the times and con- ditions of marriage and procreation and of the care of the young. Ideally, the stability of a constitution would be insured by the system just described.
From this point of view, Aristotle made no important advance over Plato. Practically, however, instability and transformation had been a most characteristic feature of Hellenic constitutional life, and as such it afforded a particularly appropriate field for the application of the Aristo- telian method. Plato's systematic treatment of the subject was limited to a fanciful sketch of the evolution of existing constitutions from his ideal form; 3 Aristotle devoted to it a whole book of The Politics, embodying an enormous mass of historical facts and a masterly exhibition of scientific analysis.
The general trend of development, from royalty through oli- 1 Tn connection with this, Aristotle inveighs even more strongly than Plato against the undue attention given by the Spartans to merely military exercises, and declares that the decline of Sparta proves that the system has been a failure.
Aristotle's criticism of this part of Plato's work is unmerciful, and also to a considerable degree unfair. Jowett's Notes ad loc. Indeed, the ideal doubtless took its character largely from the aversion which the violent and ignoble features of actual politics inspired in the reflecting mind. The most general cause of revolutionary movements -Trdatc Aristotle finds to be the craving of men for equality. It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians; as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.
Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he says,. The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.
And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.
Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says:. For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times.
Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own. When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life.
And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the. Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech.
The accompanying notes provide literary and historical references, call attention to textual problems, and supply other essential information and interpretation. A glossary supplies working definitions of key terms in Aristotle's philosophical-political vocabulary as well as a guide to linguistic relationships that are not always reflected in equivalent English terms.
Lord's extensive introduction presents a detailed account of Aristotle's life in relation to the political situation and events of his time and then discusses the problematic character and history of Aristotle's writings in general and of the Politics in particular.
Lord also outlines Aristotle's conception of political science, tracing its relation to theoretical science on the one hand and to ethics on the other. In conclusion, he briefly traces the subsequent history and influence of the Politics up to modern times. There are no reviews yet. Be the first one to write a review. Books for People with Print Disabilities.
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